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The Case Against Allowing Multiracial
Coalitions to File Section 2 Dilution Claims
Sebastian Geracit
Race and politics are intertwined in American society. In the
past, white voters openly prevented minorities from participating
in the electoral process.' Although blatant racially motivated
interference is less frequent today, the rhetoric of race still exists
in American politics. Racial bloc voting,2 and the debates over
California's Proposition 187' and affirmative action4 are examples of race and politics converging.
Recently, multiracial coalitions have begun to demand that
the judiciary consider them to be a single group under the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA"). 5 This demand has given rise to the

t B.S. 1993, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. Candidate 1996, University of Chicago.
See Shaw v Reno, 113 S Ct 2816, 2822-23 (1993)(describing past practices of racial
discrimination in elections).
2 Michael Lind, The Southern Coup: The South, the GOP and America, New Republic
20, 22 (June 19, 1995Xdescribing the racial reasons behind recent political trends); About
the Gender Gap, Wash Times, A14 (August 30, 1995)(asserting that race, not gender, is
the driving force in recent election trends); Jeffrey R. Henig, Race and Voting, 28 Urban
Affairs Q 544, 545 (1993)(noting that people tend to vote for candidates who share the
voter's ethnic background); Bryan 0. Jackson, The Effects of Racial Group Consciousness
on PoliticalMobilization in American Cities, 1092 W Political Q 631, 632 (March-December 1987Xnoting that African-Americans have higher participation rates in the electoral
process including campaign activity, voting, cooperative activity, etc.).
' Charles Lee and Lester Sloan, It's Our Turn Now, Newsweek 57 (Nov 21,
1994)(describing racial tensions between African-American and Hispanic-American voters
in California).
' Dinesh D'Souza, Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus, 2458 (Vintage Books, 1992Xdescribing the struggles between minorities over affirmative action at Berkeley); Linda Mathews, When Being Best Isn't Good Enough: Why Yat-pang Au
Won't Be Going to Berkeley, LA Times Mag, 23-28 (July 19, 1987)(describing struggle over
affirmative action at Berkeley); Sylvester Monroe, Does Affirmative Action Help or Hurt?,
Time 22-23 (May 27, 1991)(describing mixed feelings about affirmative action among African-Americans); Larry Gordon, Anti-Asian Bias Found in UCLA Program,LA Times B1
(Oct 2, 1990)(describing admission bias debate on UCLA campus).
' See Concerned Citizens of Hardee v Hardee County Bd of Commissioners, 906 F2d
524, 526 (11th Cir 1990)(ruling against a multiracial coalition because the coalition was
not politically cohesive); Meek v Metro Dade County, 908 F2d 1540, 1545-46 (11th Cir
1990)(holding that Dade county's at-large system of voting impermissibly dilutes the
voting strength of a coalition of African-American and Hispanic-American voters); League
of United Latin American Citizens, Council 4386 v Midland Independent School District,
812 F2d 1494 (5th Cir 1987)("LULAC F)(recognizing a coalition of African-American and
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question of whether Section 2 of the VRA ("Section 2") extends to
a coalition of racial or language minorities.
This Comment argues that courts should not recognize
coalitions of racial or language minorities as plaintiffs with a
cognizable claim under Section 2. Part I explains that the legislative history of the VRA suggests that multiracial coalitions are
not permissible. Part II notes a split among the courts as to
whether Section 2 should recognize multiracial coalitions. Part
III discusses three problems with allowing multiracial coalitions
to have standing under Section 2.
I. CONGRESS OPPOSED MULTIRACIAL COALITIONS IN PASSING THE

VRA.
After the Civil War, the states ratified the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution to ensure that newly
freed slaves could not be excluded from the political process.6
Unfortunately, the Amendments failed to end voting discrimination. Certain white citizens continued to exclude minorities, especially African-Americans, from the political process through racial
gerrymandering, poll taxes, and literacy tests.7 Although no one
could actually deny African-Americans the right to vote, these
policies diluted their vote and virtually eliminated them as a

Hispanic-American voters as a single entity under the VRA); League of United Latin
American Citizens, 914 F2d 620 (5th Cir 1990)("LULAC I")(failing to reach the issue of
multiracial coalitions due to finding that judicial election in question was not protected by
relevant amendments to the VRA); League of United Latin American Citizens v Clements,
986 F2d 728 (5th Cir 1993)("LULAC II")(upholding coalition's Section 2 claim without
discussing the issue of multiracial coalitions); League of United Latin American Citizens,
Council No. 4434 v Clements, 999 F2d 831 (5th Cir 1993), cert denied 114 S Ct 878
(1994)("LULAC IV")(failing to reach the issue of whether multiracial coalition is permissible because of finding that state's interest outweighed harm caused by vote dilution);
Campos v City of Baytown, Texas, 840 F2d 1240 (5th Cir 1988)(holding that Baytown's atlarge voting system impermissibly diluted the voting strength of a coalition of AfricanAmerican and Hispanic-American voters); Overton v City of Austin, 871 F2d 529 (5th Cir
1989)(holding that Austin's at-large system of voting did not violate the Section 2 rights of
a coalition of African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans); Brewer v Ham, 876 F2d 448
(5th Cir 1989)(upholding Killeen, Texas's at-large voting system over the objections of a
coalition of African-, Hispanic-, and Asian-American voters); Williams v City of Dallas,
734 F Supp 1317 (N D Tex 1990)(holding that Dallas's single-member district system
impermissibly dilutes the voting power of a coalition of African-American and HispanicAmerican voters). See also the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 USC § 1973
(1988)(attempting to end discrimination in elections).
' Congress and the Nation 1596, 1607 (Congressional Service Quarterly, Vol I 19451964)(describing the political reasons behind the Amendments); Shaw v Reno, 113 S Ct
2816, 2822-23 (1993).
Congress and the Nation at 1607 (cited in note 6); Shaw, 113 S Ct at 2822-23.
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political force in the deep South.' Racial gerrymandering frequently scattered minorities among several districts or packed
them into one district.9
In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act to prevent
state governments from denying or diluting the voting power of
racial or language minorities.'0 The law was contentious and
resulted in frequent litigation. Fifteen years later, in City of
Mobile v Bolden," the Supreme Court construed the VRA to require that plaintiffs bringing suit had to prove that the discrimination they suffered was intentional. 2
Congress rejected the Bolden intent element in the 1982
amendments to the VRA, which allowed plaintiffs to bring Section 2 claims without showing discriminatory intent."2 Congress
made it "clear that a violation [of the VRA can] be proved by
showing discriminatory effect alone... .14 As amended, Section 2 prohibits excluding any citizen from voting because of
membership in a racial or language minority. 5 The VRA prohibits restrictions that effectively prevent a protected class from
having an equal opportunity to elect its chosen representatives. 6
In a legislative compromise, Congress replaced the Bolden
"intent" test with a vague multifactor test. The factors listed
were: (1) the extent of any history of official voting discrimination; (2) the existence of racially polarized voting; (3) election
practices that enhance the opportunity for discrimination against
the minority group; (4) denial of access to minority groups in the
candidate slating process; (5) the extent to which minority groups
bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education and
employment which hinder their ability to participate in politics;
(6) racial campaign appeals; and (7) the electoral success of minorities. Additional factors that may have probative value include
the responsiveness of elected officials to the members of the mi-

' Shaw, 113 S Ct at 2822-23.
9 Id.
1 Voting

Rights Act Extension, S Rep No 97-417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 4-5 (1982), re-

printed in 1982 USCCAN 177, 206-07.
" City of Mobile v Bolden, 446 US 55 (1980)(superseded by statute)(holding that
Mobile, Alabama's at-large voting system was valid because there was no discriminatory

intent).
'2 Id.
'
'

15

S Rep No 97-417 at 28 (cited in note 10).
Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 35 (1986).
42 USC § 1973b(f)(1) (1988).

16 Id.
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nority group and whether voting qualifications are racially motivated.1 7 There is no formula for weighing the factors, no single
factor is decisive, and the factors themselves are ambiguous."
A close analysis of the VRA's language and legislative history
shows that Congress intended to bar aggregation of minority
groups. Although the VRA originally protected only AfricanAmerican voters, Congress amended it to include "persons of
Spanish heritage; all American Indians; Asian Americans including Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Filipino Americans; and Alaskan natives."19 The express listing of separate minority groups
is significant. The fact that Congress could have included language such as "all minority groups with a history of discrimination," but instead decided to name specific minority groups is
evidence that it viewed each group as distinct and wanted each
minority group to be considered separately.20
The VRA also provides that when a court is deciding whether
to allow a dilution suit, "the extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered."2
When Congress listed the classes that were protected by this
provision, it included the different minority groups listed
above.22 If Congress had intended to allow coalitions, Section 2
could have read "protected class or classes." As other commentators have noted, "the fact that both groups are protected does not
justify the assumption that a new group composed of both minorities is itself a protected minority."23
Furthermore, the legislative history of the VRA does not
support aggregation. The VRA's purpose was to eliminate barriers to political participation by certain minority groups and to
prevent their reoccurrence in another form:24 "the purpose of the
Act is to redress racial or ethnic discrimination which manifests
17 S Rep No 97-417 at 28-29.
18 Id.

19 LULAC IV, 999 F2d 831, 894 (5th Cir 1993)(Jones concurring)(describing the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act), citing 42 USC § 1973b(f)(1).
21 "That each of these groups was separately identified indicates that Congress
considered members of each group and the group itself to possess homogeneous characteristics." LULAC IV, 999 F2d at 894.

42 USC § 1973b (emphasis added)(cited in note 5).
2 LULAC IV, 999 F2d at 894 (Jones concurring), citing 42 USC § 1973b(f)(1).
Katherine I. Butler and Richard Murray, Minority Vote Dilution Suits and the
Problem of Two Minority Groups: Can a "Rainbow Coalition" Claim the Protection of the
21

Voting Rights Act?, 21 Pac L J 619, 647 (1990).
24 David H. Hunter, The 1975 Voting Rights Act and Language Minorities, 25 Cath U

L Rev 250, 251-52 (1976).
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itself in voting patterns or electoral structures."" The VRA was
not designed to cater to interest-group politics. The VRA was
intended to end discrimination,26 not to give coalitions power,
even coalitions of distinct protected minority groups. The "Purpose" section of the House Report on the 1982 Amendments specifically states that those amendments were intended to "prohibit
any voting qualification, prerequisites, standard, practice, or
procedure which results in discrimination."27 The Senate Reports for both the 1982 amendments 2s and the 1975 amendments includes similar language. 29 The House Report on the

1982 Amendments further states that "Congress expanded the
coverage of the [Voting Rights] Act [in 1975] to protect citizens
from effective disenfranchisement,"0 and that the original purpose of the 1965 Act was to remove barriers minorities faced in
accessing the political system.3 '
The VRA's express purpose has always been to end discrimination and disenfranchisement, not to increase minority representation. Allowing aggregation would simply increase minority
political power even where no minority group has been disenfranchised. While the House Report on the 1982 amendments suggests that low minority representation may be evidence of discrimination, 2 the "Purpose" of those amendments leaves no
doubt that they were intended only to remove barriers to minority political participation and not actively to promote interestgroup politics.
II. COURTS ARE SPLIT OVER THE ISSUE OF MULTIRACIAL
COALITIONS

The United States Supreme Court has established some
bright-line rules regarding when a minority group can bring a
Section 2 dilution claim. It has not ruled on whether multiracial
coalitions can be counted as a "group." Lower courts have split
over whether to allow multiracial coalitions.

- LULAC I, 812 F2d 1494, 1504 (5th Cir 1987)(Higginbotham dissenting).
26

Id.

'7

Voting Rights Act Extension, HR Rep No 97-227, 97th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1981).
S Rep No 97-417 at 2 (cited in note 10).
Voting Rights Act Extension, HR Rep No 94-196, 94th Cong, 1st Sess 2-3 (1975).

30 Id at 6.

3'Id at 4.
3' Id at 8-11.
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Deference by the Supreme Court

Lower courts received no guidance from the Supreme Court
in applying the multifactored test created by the 1982 Amendments to the VRA until Thornburg v Gingles.3 3 In Gingles, the
Supreme Court formulated a three-prong threshold test that a
Section 2 plaintiff must meet before a court will apply the
multifactored test. In order to pass the threshold, the minority
group must demonstrate that: (1) it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district, (2) it is politically cohesive, and (3) the white majority
votes sufficiently as a bloc such that it usually defeats the
minority's preferred candidate. 34 The Gingles court did not, however, address the question of whether multiracial coalitions
should be allowed to bring a claim under the VRA.
In Growe v Emison,35 a unanimous Supreme Court refused
to decide whether minority groups can be aggregated for purposes of satisfying the Gingles' requirements. In Growe, a group of
Minnesota voters challenged the state's decennial reapportionment of congressional and legislative districts alleging that the
reapportionment plan violated the state and federal constitutions. 3' Two months later, a second group of plaintiffs brought a
suit alleging violations of Section 2 of the VRA. 37 After the state
made technical changes, such as inaccurate street names and
compass directions, to the original reapportionment plan, the
first group dropped its case. 3' The district court, however, determined that these actions did not adequately redress the grievances of the second group of plaintiffs, and rejected the legislature's
amended reapportionment plan.39 Instead, the court adopted a
plan that created an oddly shaped majority-minority district that
was 43 percent African-American and 60 percent nonwhite.'
The legality of this district was the issue on appeal to the Su-

- 478 US 30 (1986).
3 Id at 50-51.
Growe v Emison, 113 S Ct 1075, 1085 (1993).
3 Id at 1077-78.
37 Id at 1078.
"

Id.
Growe, 113 S Ct at 1083.

40 Id.
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preme Court. The Court overturned the district court's ruling
because whether a compact district could be created was "dubious"4 ' and because the plaintiffs were not politically cohesive.4 2

The Growe Court required a heightened standard for the
second of the Gingles showings, political cohesiveness.
Assuming (without deciding) that it [is] possible for the
District Court to combine distinct ethnic and language
minority groups for purposes of assessing compliance
with section 2, when dilution of the power of such an
agglomerated political bloc is the basis for an alleged
violation, proof of minority political cohesion is all the
more essential.'
As with all Section 2 dilution claims, the plaintiff carries the
burden to demonstrate this cohesiveness statistically." The
Court held that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden and
thus refused to rule on the issue of multiracial coalitions. 4'
While it remains unclear whether the VRA permits Section 2
dilution claims by multiracial coalitions, the Supreme Court has
insisted that if such coalitions are allowed, they must still satisfy
the Gingles prerequisites.
B.

Split in the Lower Courts

Following Growe, some lower courts have allowed minority
groups to aggregate for a Section 2 VRA claim; the Fifth Circuit
has been the most active in this area. 46 In contrast, several oth-

41
42

Id at 1085.
Id.

Growe, 113 S Ct at 1085.
"[A] court may not presume bloc voting within even a single minority group." Id.
Id.
41 See LULAC IV, 999 F2d 831 (5th Cir 1993), cert denied 114 S Ct 878 (1994);
Overton v City of Austin, 871 F2d 529 (5th Cir 1989)(holding that Austin's at-large system
of voting did not violate the Section 2 rights of a coalition of African-, Hispanic-, and
Asian-American voters); Brewer v Ham, 876 F2d 448 (5th Cir 1989)(upholding Killeen,
Texas's at-large voting system over the objections of a coalition of African-, Hispanic-, and
Asian-American voters); Campos v City of Baytown, Texas, 840 F2d 1240 (5th Cir
1988)(holding that Baytown's at-large voting system impermissibly diluted the voting
strength of a coalition of African-American and Hispanic-American voters); LULAC I, 812
F2d 1494 (5th Cir 1987); Williams, 734 F Supp 1317 (N D Tex 1990).
"
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er circuits have avoided ruling on this issue by deciding these
cases on alternate grounds.4 7
The leading pro-aggregation case, League of United Latin
American Citizens v Clements ("LULAC 1") allowed the aggregation of an African-American group and a Hispanic-American
group in west Texas.' In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that
the use of an at-large voting system effectively diluted their votes
in local school board elections.4 9 The Fifth Circuit upheld the
district court's ruling and aggregated the two groups, despite a
University of Texas survey which demonstrated that the minority
groups had dissimilar attitudes on key local issues, significantly
different views on a variety of political issues, and, ultimately,
"mutually exclusive interests." ° In ruling that the coalition
passed the cohesiveness test, the LULAC I court adopted the
lower court's findings that the two groups "shared common experiences in past discriminatory practices ...
[and] have political
goals that are inseparable."5 ' The Fifth Circuit ruled that the
fact that "[African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans] worked
together and formed coalitions when their goals were compatible," 2 satisfied the "politically cohesive" prong of the Gingles
test.
Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham wrote a forceful dissent in
LULAC L' He pointed out that the district court's only justification for aggregation was its finding that denying aggregation
would be "inherently unjust" because the plaintiffs would lose.5
Judge Higginbotham also criticized the majority for their finding
that minorities are inherently cohesive due to their joint history
of discrimination.55 Furthermore, he attacked the majority's decision to ignore the University of Texas survey."

" Angelo N. Ancheta and Kathryn K. Imahara, Multi-Ethnic Voting Rights: Redefining Vote Dilution in Communities of Color, 27 USF L Rev 815, 842-43 (1993). The courts
declined to rule on this issue because they found that the multiracial coalition was not a
cohesive group and so could not pass the Gingles test even if aggregation were allowed.
4
LULAC 1, 812 F2d at 1494.
49 Id.
'0 Id at 1501.
" Id at 1500.
52 LULAC 1, 812 F2d at 1501.
Id at 1503-09 (Higginbotham dissenting).
Id at 1505.
Id at 1506.
LULAC 1, 812 F2d at 1506 (Higginbotham dissenting). Judge Higginbotham wrote:
"[Tihe district [court's finding] ... that voter attitudes were not relevant to how people
vote [is] a rather startling proposition." Id.
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Nevertheless, other Fifth Circuit cases have also acknowledged the possibility of aggregating minorities for Section 2 dilution claims. 7 In Campos v City of Baytown," the court explicitly justified its aggregation theory by noting that nothing in the
law prohibited aggregation and that African- and
Hispanic-Americans have faced a common history of discrimination. The Fifth Circuit again accepted aggregation of distinct
minority groups in League of United Latin American Citizens v
Midland Independent School Board59 ("LULAC IV") without any
further justification.
The Eleventh Circuit has also expressly allowed coalitions, 0
but has offered no justification for aggregation except to note that
it has been allowed in the Fifth Circuit.6 ' In Concerned Citizens
of Hardee v Hardee Board of Commissioners,62 the court stated
that "two minority groups may be a single section 2 minority if
they can establish that they behave in a politically cohesive manner."' However, the Eleventh Circuit's only support for this conclusion was a citation to Campos and LULAC I." At least one
subsequent Eleventh Circuit case has cited Hardee to justify
aggregation of distinct minority groups without articulating a
new rationale.65
Although the Ninth Circuit has confronted aggregation
claims, it has not yet decided the issue. In Romero v City of
Pomona,66 the court refused to decide whether aggregation was
acceptable. It never reached the issue, deciding instead that the
potential coalition failed both the first and second prongs of the
Gingles test.67 Similarly, in Badillo v City of Stockton," the
court did not reach the issue of aggregation because it found that
the coalition was not cohesive.69

"7 Campos, 840 F2d at 1240; Overton, 871 F2d at 529; Brewer, 876 F2d at 448;
LULAC IV, 999 F2d at 831; Williams, 734 F Supp at 1317.
Campos, 840 F2d at 1240.
9 LULAC IV, 999 F2d at 864.
Concerned Citizens of Hardee v Hardee County Bd of Commissioners, 906 F2d 524,
526 (11th Cir 1990); Meek v Metro Dade County, 908 F2d 1540, 1545-46 (11th Cir 1990).
1 Hardee, 906 F2d at 526, citing Campos, 840 F2d at 1244, and LULAC 1, 812 F2d at
1500-02.
Hardee, 906 F2d at 524.
Id at 526, citing Campos, 840 F2d at 1244; LULAC I, 812 F2d at 1500-02.
Id at 526, citing Campos, 840 F2d at 1244; LULAC I, 812 f2d at 1500-02.
'
Meek, 908 F2d at 1540.
Romero v City of Pomona, 883 F2d 1418 (9th Cir 1989).
6'

Id at 890-91.
Badillo v City of Stockton, 956 F2d 884 (9th Cir 1992).
Id at 890-91.
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Still there is some evidence that the Ninth Circuit may allow
aggregation in some situations. The Ninth Circuit did not take
issue with an amended complaint that added African-Americans
to a dilution suit brought by Hispanic-Americans. Instead, the
coalition's claim eventually failed because it lacked evidence of
the coalition's inability to elect its chosen candidates.7"
The most eloquent opposition to aggregation is Judge Edith
Jones' concurrence in LULAC IV. 7 1 She argued that "Congress
did not authorize the pursuit of Section 2 vote dilution claims by
coalitions of distinct ethnic and language minorities."7 2 To do so
would be an extension of the VRA that only Congress can authorize.7" Judge Jones further stated that the VRA's current language showed Congress did not intend Section 2 to cover coalitions.7 4 Additionally, coalitions hurt minorities by denying differences between distinct ethnic groups and by lumping them
into one district where infighting would occur.7" Finally, aggregated multiracial coalitions would be difficult to administer because they would result in an explosion of lawsuits and force
courts continually to redraw districts.7"
The Slippery Slope of Multiracial Coalitions

C.

Allowing a coalition of distinct minority groups to bring a
Section 2 dilution claim would be a radical departure from the
VRA's purpose of ending racial discrimination. The VRA was
intended to protect a group of racial and ethnic groups.77 However, a multiracial coalition, by definition, is not bound by a common ethnicity. Such coalitions are bound by common ideas, values, and political goals. The real purpose, therefore, in protecting
a multiracial coalition, would be to protect ideas, not an historically oppressed racial minority.7"
Allowing multiracial coalitions to bring Section 2 dilution
claims would be a significant step towards establishing a right to
proportional representation, something the VRA specifically dis-

Valladolid v City of National City, 976 F2d 1293, 1294, 1297-98 (9th Cir 1992).
"' LULAC IV, 999 F2d at 894 (Jones concurring).
72 Id.
73 Id.
70

74 Id.
75 LULAC
76

77 Id.
7'

IV, 999 F2d 896 (Jones concurring).

Id.
HR Rep No 94-196, 94th Cong, 1st Sess 2-3 (1975)(cited in note 29).
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avows. 7 9 If each group in the coalition is facing barriers to its
ability to vote, or is having its vote diluted, then each group can
bring a separate VRA claim. If there is no active discrimination,
the only justification for a dilution claim is that it would cause
the state's Congressional delegation to reflect the coalition's race
better. But this is nothing more than saying that the racial composition of the state's Congressional delegation should be closer
to the state's racial make-up. Proportional representation, however, is a right expressly denied by the VRA.8 ° Therefore, the VRA
must forbid multiracial coalitions from bringing dilution claims
based only on a "right to proportional representation."
While the VRA, its amendments, and the accompanying
reports do not explicitly disallow multiracial coalitions, Professor
Joseph Bishop, in a letter to the Senate Judiciary committee
included in the Senate report, expressed his belief that the VRA
indirectly addresses this issue.8 Professor Bishop questions "[i]f,
for example, [African-Americans] are 20 per cent [sic] of the population of a state, [Hispanic-Americans] 15 per cent [sic], and
Indians 2 per cent [sic], then at least 20 per cent [sic] of the
members of the legislature must be [African-American], 15 per
cent [sic] Hispanic-American, and 2 per cent [sic] Indian."82 The
Senate Judiciary committee rejected this notion, calling it an
attempt to impose proportional representation.83 It is probable,
therefore, that the committee would also have rejected the notion
that 37 percent of legislators must be from a coalition of distinct
minority groups even if districts could be created to ensure this
outcome. Allowing multiracial coalitions would, in effect, be saying that the legislature in Professor Bishop's hypothetical state
would have to approximate the state's racial composition even if
no single group could bring a dilution claim. It would allow coalitions of distinct minority groups to accomplish proportional representation indirectly despite the VRA's language barring them
from doing this directly. Under the VRA, minority groups sometimes cannot claim even one representative because they do not

42 USC § 1973b.
'o
"
82

Id. See also HR Rep No 97-227, 97th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1981)(cited in note 27).
S Rep No 97-417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 141 (1982)(cited in note 10).

Id.
Id at 142, 146.
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"constitute a majority in a single member district."' Permitting
all local minorities to aggregate themselves artificially would
allow each group to surmount this hurdle. 5
Moreover, protecting coalitions is similar to protecting political parties. A coalition is a group of people who share common
ideas, values, and political goals and work together to elect mutually acceptable candidates, much like a political party.8" The
courts, therefore, should treat these coalitions as political parties;
such parties are not entitled to representation in the government,
nor are they protected under the VRA. 7 If courts accept multiracial coalitions, should courts also count the number of white
votes in the minority group? Those white cross-over voters likely
have as much in common with the coalition's members as the
coalition's members have in common with each other. At the very
least, they share a common ideology. While the background of the
white cross-over voters would be different from the backgrounds
of the aggregation's minority members, the minority members
would also have different backgrounds from each other. The only
uniting force is a common set of beliefs. What is such a coalition,
therefore, other than a political party? At what point should
courts draw a line and refuse to allow new groups to join a coalition? Even if courts could come up with an acceptable answer,
once courts head down this path, a flood of litigation will ensue
as courts struggle over these very questions.
Coalitions Deny the Diversity of Minority Groups

D.

Another problem with aggregation is that allowing coalitions
assumes that all minority groups are homogeneous. This assumption is false. Every ethnic group has a unique history, religion,
and culture. Although different groups, for different reasons, may
reach the same conclusions on certain issues, that goes to the
fact that they are distinct groups. "Considerable sociological literature also demonstrates 'social distance' between minority groups
that seems inconsistent with widespread coalition minority political cohesion . . . . [S]tudies indicate that minorities in fact identify more closely with the dominant group than with other minorities."88 Saying that minority groups are all alike demeans
Gingles, 478 US at 50.
'

LULAC IV, 999 F2d at 896 (Jones concurring).

"
In fact, this is the definition of a political party. See Webster's Dictionary of the
English Language 733 (Lexicon Publications, 1989).
87 42 USC § 1973b(f)(1).
- LULAC IV, 999 F2d at 897-98 (Jones concurring). See also James Dyer, Arnold
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minorities and contradicts the findings of such social science
literature.
A large national survey conducted semiannually reveals
considerable political heterogeneity among America's ethnic minorities.89 For example, the survey tested attitudes towards the
Republican party on a scale of 0-100 with 100 being the highest
possible score and zero the lowest possible score. 0 AfricanAmericans gave Republicans a "45," indicating overall disapproval while Asian-Americans gave the Republican party a "69," indicating considerable approval.9 Almost three-quarters (74.3 percent) of African-American respondents disapproved of President
Ronald Reagan's and President George Bush's handling of the
economy92 while Southeast-Asians, Indians, and Afghanis gave
Reagan's and Bush's economic policies a disapproval rating of
only 45.3,93 a considerable difference. The survey also asked respondents which of the following national issues was the most
desirable to achieve: (1) maintaining order in the nation; (2)
giving the people more say in important political decisions; (3)
fighting rising prices; or (4) protecting freedom of speech.94 African-Americans felt that giving people more say in important
political decisions was the most important national priority while
Asian- and Hispanic-Americans felt that maintaining order was
paramount.95 The survey also asked respondents which political
party, if any, would do a better job in handling the nation's most
important issues. 96 While Hispanic- and African-Americans felt
that the Democrats would do a better job, Asian-Americans felt
that Republicans were preferable. 97
Most social-science data reflect this heterogeneity between
minority groups. The LULAC I court noted one survey, performed
by the University of Texas.9" That survey showed that Africanand Hispanic-Americans in Midland, Texas have different and
Vedlitz, and Stephen Worchel, Social DistanceAmong Racial and Ethnic Groups in Texas:
Some Demographic Correlates, 70 Soc Sci Q 607, 613-614 (1989).
' National Election Studies ("NES"), American National Election Studies 1948-1994,

V224 (1994)(detailing attitudinal surveys of American voters from 1984-1992).
® Id at 224.
" Id (defining Asian-Americans as Americans of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, South-

east Asian, Indian, and/or Afghani descent).
Id at 9008.
NES, American NationalElection Studies 1948-1994 at 9008 (cited in note 89).
Id at V9019.
5 Id.

"

'6
'7
"

Id at 9012.
NES, American NationalElection Studies 1948-1994 at 9012 (cited in note 89).
LULAC 1 812 F2d at 1501.
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mutually exclusive interests.9 9 It demonstrated that voters in

each distinct minority group would be more likely to vote for a
candidate of their own race than any other candidate, including
one from a different minority group." °
The divergent attitudes of Hispanic- and African-Americans
in Miami are also a testament to the heterogeneity of different
ethnic minorities. Almost two-thirds of Miami's residents are of
Cuban descent and 27 percent are African-American." 1 "There's
a rivalry and resentment between the two communities." 2 As
one African-American activist noted following the January, 1989
riots, "[e]verything was planned and targeted: protect black businesses and get the white man, the Hispanic and the Arab out of
our community."0 3 The evidence supports this claim.'1"
The hostility is partially caused by economics. Marvin Dunn,
an African-American activist and psychologist, hypothesized that
economic frustrations toward other races led to the Miami riots
noted above.' 5 The unemployment rate in the African-American community is triple the rate among Hispanic-Americans."6
African- and Hispanic-American leaders encourage members of
their communities to refrain from buying from businesses owned
by members of other races, including other minorities. 1 7 In
1990, a group of African-Americans commenced a boycott of some
Miami businesses until they hired more young African-Americans. 108
These resentments run deep in Miami's different communities. When Nelson Mandela visited Miami in 1990, five Dade
County mayors, including Xavier Suarez of Miami, refused to
meet him because Mr. Mandela refused to denounce the human-

'9 Id.
10 Id.
101 Scott Simon, Miami Blacks and Cubans on Race Relations, Nat'l Pub Radio 1 (Feb

1, 1992)(describing racial tensions between Miami's African-American and HispanicAmerican communities).
102
10"

Id.

Miami Reflective as Calm Returns, Chi Trib 5 (Jan 20, 1989)(describing the Miami
riots of 1989).
104 For example, an Associated Press reporter described seeing an unharmed AfricanAmerican-owned open-air market a few feet next to a gutted Cuban-owned meat market.
Id.
102 Id.
100 Simon, Nat'l Pub Radio at 1 (cited in note 101).
7 Id at 3.
108 Mike
Clary, Police in Miami Brace For Violence, LA Times A16 (June 29,
199lXdescribing racial tensions in Miami and a planned boycott).
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rights policies of Fidel Castro."1 °9 Black leaders were outraged
and called the mayors' actions a shameful and disgraceful
snub."' They organized a boycott of Miami's convention and
tourist businesses and held a press conference at which they released a videotape "comparing conditions in Miami to those of
Selma, in the 1960s.""'
In California, the recent debate over Proposition 187 also
helps demonstrate the heterogeneity of different races. An African-American voter was twice as likely to support the measure as
an Hispanic-American voter."' But the divisions in southern
California run far deeper than any one issue. Ethnic struggles
between Hispanic- and African-Americans are dividing Compton,
California, a poor city located south of Watts in Los Angeles."'
Although Hispanic-Americans form a majority in Compton, no
Hispanic-American has ever served on the city council,1 and
only 14 of 127 city police officers are Hispanic-American." 5 This
last statistic became especially important recently when an African-American police officer was videotaped using excessive force
while arresting an Hispanic-American suspect."' Compton's African-American leaders have responded by noting the low voter
turnout in Hispanic-American neighborhoods. "7 "'African-Americans fought for the right to vote,' says Compton Mayor Omar
Bradley. 'Is it [our] responsibility to elect Latinos?""'5
At the University of California at Berkeley, verbal hostilities
recently broke out between Asian-, African-, and Hispanic-Americans over the issue of affirmative action." 9 Asian-Americans
were outraged by what they perceived as Berkeley's attempt to
achieve proportional representation of all races by denying admission to Asian-Americans in favor of African- and HispanicAmericans. 2 ' Nevertheless, support for affirmative action re"o9Simon, Nat'l Pub Radio at 3 (cited in note 101).
"o Clary, LA Times at A16 (cited in note 108).
"
Id.
12 Charles Lee and Lester Sloan, It's Our Turn Now, Newsweek 57 (Nov 21,
1994)(cited in note 3).
13

Id.

11

Id.
15 Id.
"' Lee and Sloan, Newsweek at 57 (cited in note 3).
17

Id.

Id.
.. Dinesh D'Souza, Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus 31
(Vintage Books, 1992)(cited in note 4); Linda Mathews, When Being Best Isn't Good
Enough: Why Yat-pang Au Won't Be Going to Berkeley, Los Angeles Times Magazine 23-28
(July 19, 1987)(cited in note 4).
120 Mathews at 30 (cited at note 3); Richard Bernstein, Asian Students Harmed by
"8
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mains strong among many minority-group members. 2 ' Similar
disputes have broken out at Harvard University and the University of California at Los Angeles.'22
Los Angeles also has a long history of political fighting between minority groups.'23 Following the race riots of 1965, Hispanic-Americans and conservative whites formed an alliance to
counter the growing political power of African-Americans and
white liberals. 2 4 By 1973, however, Hispanic- and AfricanAmericans had forged a political alliance sufficiently strong to
overcome conservative white opposition and win the city's mayoral elections.'2 5 But severe strains developed in the African-American/Hispanic-American alliance."' During the first 12 years of
the alliance, no Hispanic-American served on the city's council
and, in 1982, a group of Hispanic-Americans filed a lawsuit challenging Los Angeles's redistricting plan. 2 7 African-American/Hispanic-American relations became so strained that by 1992
a survey revealed that African-Americans in Los Angeles were
more likely to feel "very close" or "fairly close" to whites than
Hispanic-Americans. 2 '
When distinct minority groups' political successes increase,
interminority conflicts often develop.2 9 Even within races, diPrecursors'Success, NY Times 16 (July 10, 1988)(describing Asian anger at Berkeley's
affirmative action program).
'21Sylvester Monroe, Does Affirmative Action Help or Hurt?, Time 22 (May 27,
1991)(cited in note 4).
" D'Souza, Illiberal Education at 29 (cited in note 4); Karen De Witt, Harvard
Cleared in Inquiry on Bias, NY Times 35 (Oct 7, 1990); Larry Gordon, Anti-Asian Bias
Found in UCLA Program, LA Times BI (Oct 2 1990)(cited in note 4).
12 Raphael J. Sonenshein, The Dynamics of Biracial Coalitions: Crossover Politics in
Los Angles, 92 W Political Q 333 (June 1989)(describing the political fighting among Los
Angeles's various races from 1961-1989); Harlan Hahn, David Klingman, and Harry
Pachon, Cleavages, Coalitions, and the Black Candidate: The Los Angeles Mayoralty
Elections of 1969 and 1973, 29 W Political Q 507, 515 (1979)(describing the AfricanAmerican and Hispanic-American split in two Los Angeles elections).
124 Sonenschein, W Political Q at 341-42 (cited in note 123).
122 Id at 342-43; Hahn, W Political Q at 514 (cited in note 123).
126 Sonenschein, W Political Q at 346-47 (cited in note 123).
127 Id at 347.
'8 Byran 0. Jackson, Elisabeth R. Gerber, and Bruce E. Cain, CoalitionalProspects in
a Multi-Racial Society: African-American Attitudes Toward Other Minority Groups, Pol
Research Q 377, 381 (1992)(describing African-American attitudes).
"' Paula D. McClain and Albert K. Karnig, Black and Hispanic Socioeconomic and
PoliticalCompetition, 84 Am Pol Sci Rev 535, 542 (1990)(describing the political competition between African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans in the 49 largest U.S. cities);
Rodney E. Hero, Multiracial Coalitions in City Elections Involving Minority Candidates,
25 Urban Aff Q 342, 349 (1989)(describing political competition between African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans in Denver); Charles Lane, Ghetto Chic, New Republic 14, 16
(Aug 12, 1991)(describing the political fighting between New York city's African-American
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vergent attitudes resulting from different groups' experiences can
divide races. For instance, Miami's Hispanic-Americans, who are
mostly of Cuban descent, are overwhelmingly Republicans,30
while California's Hispanic-Americans,
who are primarily of Mex131
ican descent, are mostly Democrats.
This lack of homogeneity supports disallowing multiracial
coalitions. These coalitions treat minorities as homogeneous and
ignore their real differences. The Supreme Court stated in Growe
that even if such coalitions were acceptable, a "higher-than-usual" burden is on multiracial coalitions to demonstrate their political cohesiveness.3 2 If the Court were to allow aggregation of
different ethnic groups for Section 2 claims, the bulk of socialscience data demonstrates that different ethnic groups would not
be able to satisfy the normal Gingles political cohesiveness test,
let alone the more stringent Growe test.
It should not be enough that some minority groups may form
temporary alliances. To sue under Section 2, Gingles requires
political cohesion within the group. 33 Support for a candidate
who is not the first choice of either group but who is a compromise candidate should not be taken as evidence of cohesion. In
his Gingles opinion, Justice Brennan noted that "under Section 2
[of the VRA], it is the status of the candidate as the chosen representative of a particularracial group ...

that is important.""3

Therefore, for a coalition's candidate to pass the Gingles test, the
candidate would have to be the first choice of both groups. This
may be true in some circumstances, but the more likely scenario
is that both groups have their own candidates and the larger of
the two groups would win in a run-off or primary election. The
groups in that case are not really cohesive; they have merely

and Hispanic-American communities over redistricting); Frank J. Macchiarola and Joseph
G. Diaz, Minority PoliticalEmpowerment in New York City: Beyond the Voting Rights Act,
Pol Sci Q 27, 48-51 (1993)(describing the political tensions between African-Americans,
Hispanic-Americans, and Asian-Americans in New York City's redistricting process).
"3 Susan Welch and Lee Sigelman, The Politics of HispanicAmericans: Insights from
National Surveys, 1980-1988, 74 Soc Sci Q 76, 77 (1993)(noting that from 1960-1984, 6080 percent of Mexican-Americans voted for Democrats in Presidential elections although
Cuban-Americans are disproportionately Republican); Simon, Nat'l Pub Radio at 3 (cited
in note 101).
"' Michael Lind, The Southern Coup: The South, the GOP and America, New Republic
20, 22 (June 19, 1995)(cited in note 2).
1
Growe, 113 S Ct at 1085.
Gingles, 478 US at 51.
Id at 68 (emphasis in original).
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formed a temporary political alliance that will end when the
group's political agendas diverge or when another racial group
offers one group an alliance on better terms.
Thus, even aggregations which appear on the surface to be
politically cohesive should not be allowed to aggregate in a Section 2 claim. Although different ethnic groups have different
cultures, values and political agendas, temporary alliances between groups may be possible to promote certain items. However,
such alliances do not pass the Gingles test unless the coalition's
candidate was the first choice of both groups.13 5 This is unlikely
given the groups' differences. It is also questionable whether the
cost of the extra litigation produced by expanding Section 2 to
allow multiracial coalitions would be worth only an occasional
plaintiffs victory.
Aggregations may also hurt minority groups by creating
clashes between aggregated minority groups vying for control of
the coalition's political agenda. Both minority groups will suffer
as a result. The political infighting that would result from aggregating could destroy the fragile coalitions which have proven so
crucial in the civil-rights struggle. For example, in Miami
Hispanic-Americans of Cuban descent have largely become Republicans. 6 in what could be seen as a political alliance with
whites against Miami's African-Americans. Thus, Miami, a city
which is at most 8 percent white,137 continues to elect candidates favored by conservative whites for many state and federal
positions.
CONCLUSION

Minority groups in America have long been discriminated
against with respect to their right to vote. The VRA, as amended,
was an important step towards ending that discrimination. Unfortunately, the VRA and subsequent Supreme Court cases have
failed to answer the question of whether multiracial coalitions
are equivalent to minority groups when alleging vote-dilution
claims under Section 2 of the VRA. In lieu of express guidance
from either the Supreme Court or Congress, the lower courts
have come to conflicting results.
Multiracial aggregation should be rejected. To do otherwise

135 Id.

" Simon, Nat'l Pub Radio at 5 (cited in note 101).
.37Id at 1.
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would not only contradict the purpose of the VRA, but would also
demean minorities by treating them as fungible commodities. In
addition, allowing aggregation under the auspices of the VRA
might actually hurt the very people the VRA intended to protect,
by spurring increased gerrymandering and infighting among
minority groups. Refusing to recognize multiracial coalitions for
vote-dilution claims would prevent these problems and would
best serve the interests of the groups the VRA was designed to
protect.

